Introduction
justly wrote the first paper of the first number of the electronic journal Bayesian Analysis. His purported purpose was to elaborate on the term "Bayesian" as an adjective. In the process of this elaboration, Professor Fienberg produced a fine analysis of the history of what we know today as Bayesian Statistics. His bibliography is extensive with 184 items. Some of them (like his quotations from Jack Good and John Pratt) are in the form of personal correspondence.
He takes us on a marvelous journey of two hundred years of history of Bayes and Bayesian thinking. He divides the history into three distinct phases. First came Bayes and Laplace with a reminder of Stigler's Law of Eponymy ("no scientific discovery is named after its original discoverer"). Then, as a precursor to the modern development, he discussed contributions during the first five decades of the Twentieth Century. Finally, he brought in the NeoBayesian Revival of the 1950s.
Fienberg quotes from Lindley (2000) , "When I began studying statistics in 1943 the term 'Bayesian' hardly existed; 'Bayes' yes, we had his theorem, but not the adjective." Fienberg also notes that Good (1950) "writing on the weighing of evidence using Bayes' Theorem, in the third paragraph of the preface used the phrase 'subjective probability judgments,' but nowhere in the book did he use the adjective 'Bayesian'."
Fienberg notes that the usage of the term "Bayesian" was published during 1950-1951: One by Ronald Fisher in 1950 (in a pejorative way) and by Jimmy Savage in 1951 where he used the phrase "unBayesian" (Savage, 1951, p. 58) . Neither usage would count as we use the term today as an adjective. Fienberg then writes "[a] search of JSTOR reveals no earlier usage in any of the main American and British statistical journals." He then goes on to suggest that it was Jimmy Savage that brought the Bayesian adjective to the fore.
In what follows, we will discuss the role that economists have played during the critical period of the development of the Neo-Bayesian Revival. In particular, we point out the contribution of the 2007 Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Professor Leonid L Hurwicz.
Jimmy Savage and Economics
Fienberg justifiably examines Savage's book "The Foundation of Statistics" as a milestone for the Neo-Bayesian Revival. It is striking that the first five chapters of the book could very well have been called "The Foundation of Economic Theory Under Risk and Uncertainty." It begins with the (Expected) Utility Theory -which has become the cornerstone of modern micro and macro economic theories of today.
Savage's book did more than provide the foundation of modern economic theory. His book (unwittingly) propagated an expansion. For exa mple, in 1952 in a well known encounter, at the Econometric Society's meeting in Paris, Maurice Allais presented Savage (and other participants) with the following hypothetical choices.
Situation 1: Choose between
Gamble 1: $500,000 with probability 1; and Gamble 2: $2,500,000 with probability 0.1, $500,00 with probability 0.89, status quo with probability 0.01.
Situation 2: Choose between
Gamble 3: $500,000 with probability 0.11, status quo with probability 0. 89; and Gamble 4: $2,500,000 with probability 0.1, status quo with probability 0.90.
Savage chose gambles 1 and 4 respectively. Allais noted that it contradicted expected utility theory -the very foundation of a rational decision maker of The Foundations of Statistics! As we all know, in the book, Savage goes on to describe why such a choice was not rational (even though he himself made the choice initially).
A small exchange like this could have just been a curiosum -a footnote to the history of economics. But it did not turn out that way. Allais went on to develop the theory of Non-Expected Utility for which he and later Daniel Kahneman went on to win Nobel Prizes in Economics (Amos Tversky -the close collaborator of Kahneman would also have won the prize had he not died before the prize was awarded).
Thus, we contend that Jimmy Savage strongly influenced the critical development of economic theory as a whole. To prove our point, we did some bean-counting. There were slightly less than one thousand references in JSTOR of the book by Savage (ending in 2006) . Of them around 30 percent were in economics journals. For sure, some of them occurred in journals that were right in the intersection of these two disciplines: Economics and Statistics. A classic example is Chernoff (1954) . He refers to Savage's "Notes on the Foundations of Statistics" with the comment that it would be published in a book form. In turn, Savage's research was also influenced by economics. To wit, around a quarter of his references are directly from economics literature.
In contrast to mainstream economics, we all know that Savage's book was not very well received by many classical statistical theorists. For example, Chung (1955) The Cowles Commission emerged as the second most influential institution in economics (after the National Bureau of Economic Research) both at the policy level and more importantly, for its cont ribution to economic theory. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was a hotbed of research in both economics and statistics. Thus, it is not surprising to find that researchers there were intensely working on Bayesian issues. In particular, Leonid Hurwicz was working on Bayesian formulations of decision making under risk and uncertainty. More on Bayesian work at the Cowles Commission can be found in Fienberg and Zellner (1975) .
The Cowles Commission operated at the University of Chicago between 1939 and 1955, before moving to its permanent home at Yale University. Hildreth (1981) provides a history of the Commission during this period.
Leonid Hurwicz and the Bayesian adjective
Hurwicz was a remarkable man. He was born in Moscow in 1917, grew up in Poland, survived the Holocaust just by a hair, took the last boat to leave Europe to arrive in New Jersey with no money and a degree in Law from the University of Warsaw. That was his only degree he ever earned (apart from honorary degrees from a number of universities). Yet he went on to become one of the foremost economic theorists of the Twentieth Century and the oldest recipient of a Nobel Prize in any subject (at the age of 90). He also became the only person to have received a Nobel Prize without ever forma lly studying economics (Sinha, 2008 any statisticians feel that, in their own practice, they have to choose a 'decision function' (i.e., they have to design a sample or an experiment and derive in advance a formula relating action to observation) without any advance knowledge as to the relative probabilities of alternative states of nature. The same is true of many practical situations. In fact, only in exceptional cases (such as life insurance, games of chance, and scientific predictions based on much past experience) does the decision-maker have good information on the relevant probabilities. In the general case, such information is not available; hence moral expectation cannot be computed. Additional criteria become necessary. Thus a pessimist will assume the worst possible state of nature to be true and hence will maximize the lowest possible moral expectation; while, as pointed out by Franco Modigliani, the optimist will maximize the maximum moral expectation. Leonid Hurwicz formulated a certain compromise between the two attitudes. In general, the compromise may be slanted toward optimism or pessimism, the extent of the slant being part of a person's 'tastes.' Another criterion was suggested by L.J. Savage and, independently, by Jurg Niehans of Zurich: for any given state of nature define as 'loss' (or 'regret') the difference between the highest moral expectation that could be obtained if that state were known and the moral expectation obtained from a given action; then choose the action for which the highest loss is lower than for any other action." (http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/reports/1950-51a.htm)
In the paper referred to in the previous paragraph, Hurwicz (1951a) introduced his famous "alpha" that mitigated between minimax and maximax rules of decision. Milnor (1951) in his now famous RAND Research Memorandum expanded upon this rule. On page 2 of the same paper, Hurwicz notes: "The solution has been called 'Bayesian' (or 'Bayes Optimal') with regard to H (0) (b)." Thus, already in February of 1951, we have documented proof that Hurwicz was using the term Bayesian as an adjective. In a subsequent Discussion Paper, Hurwicz (1951b) mentions "the Bayesian case" once more. Thus, not only was he using the phrase Bayesian as an adjective, he was also anticipating the difference between Bayesian and non-Bayesian cases in the ambit of decision making under uncertainty. In footnote 1 of the same paper, he notes, "The more usual procedure is first to form a 'risk function' ρ(I F , Ψ) with ρ depending on the statistician's preferences when ϑ ∋ * is of the Bayesian type".
Is that the earliest reference to a clearly documented Bayesian we find in the Neo-Bayesian Revival movement? The answer is negative. In a paper dated December 25, 1950 , Hurwicz (1950a develops a technique of estimation using Bayes Theorem. In discussing the method, he remarks, "The foregoing techniques … can be applied to justify (from the Bayesian point of view) the maximum likelihood method of estimation of the mean µ of a normal distribution with a known variance σ 2 ".
At around the same time, Hurwicz (1950b) noted "At the opposite extreme there exists the 'Bayesian' formulation, where it is assumed that a probability measure ξ on ϑ (an 'a priori distribution') is known to the statistician."
The main contribution, for which Hurwicz shared his Nobel Prize with two others (Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin), was pioneering work on Mechanism Design. He also received the National Medal of Science in 1990 in Behavorial and Social Science "for his pioneering work on the theory of modern decentralized allocation mechanisms". He became the only economist to receive that honor before winning the Nobel Prize. This shows the diversity of Hurwicz's research.
In more than one occasion, researchers have discovered results only to find that Hurwicz was there first. He was a true scientific "Kilroy". For example, in an interview, Jack Good once noted that after he introduced the notion of hierarchical Bayesian analysis: "the econometrician, L. Hurwicz, turned out to have published an abstract a few months before my 1951 paper, suggesting the minimax example…" (Banks, 1996) .
Not only did Hurwicz use the term "Bayesian" as an adjective in his research papers in the early part of 1950s, he was already using these notions for the course he was teaching in the statistics department at the University of Minnesota. This example shows that Hurwicz propagated the notion of Bayesian Statistics to the next generation of students. Some of these students went on to become outstanding econometricians of their own rights. Indeed, one such shining example was Daniel McFadden who went on to win a Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on discrete choice econometrics.
Final Remarks
We provided evidence that Leonid Hurwicz might be the first person to have used the term Bayesian as an adjective. We have shown that during the NeoBayesian Revival, a strong interaction took place among Economists and Statisticians: the ideas of an axiomatic foundation for the rational behavior of an economic agent on one hand, as well as for the coherent production of statistical inferences, on the other. They were essentially variations of the same theme. In the case of Economics, the resulting criteria of maximizing the expected utility came to occupy the central stage of modern (neoclassical) economic theory. On statistical theory, the effect was somehow different. The Neo-Bayesian Revival led to a new paradigm: the axiomatic development of Bayesian Theory of Statistics.
